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Abstract
In this paper we study a class of matrix-valued linear-quadratic
mean-field-type games for both the risk-neutral, risk-sensitive and ro-
bust cases. Non-cooperation, full cooperation and adversarial between
teams are treated. We provide a semi-explicit solution for both prob-
lems by means of a direct method. The state dynamics is described by
a matrix-valued linear jump- diffusion-regime switching system of con-
ditional mean-field type where the conditioning is with respect to com-
mon noise which is a regime switching process. The optimal strate-
gies are in a state-and-conditional mean-field feedback form. Semi-
explicit solutions of equilibrium costs and strategies are also provided
for the full cooperative, adversarial teams, risk-sensitive full cooper-
ative and risk-sensitive adversarial team cases. It is shown that full
cooperation increases the well-posedness domain under risk-sensitive
decision-makers by means of population risk-sharing. Finally, rela-
tionship between risk-sensitivity and robustness are established in the
mean-field type context.
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1 Introduction
The Markowitz paradigm, also termed as the mean-variance paradigm, is of-
ten characterized as dealing with portfolio risk and (expected) return [1, 2, 3].
A typical example of risk concerns in the current online market is the evolu-
tion of prices of the digital and cryptocurrencies (bitcoin, litecoin, ethereum,
dash, and other altcoins etc). Variance plays a base model for many risk mea-
sures. Here, we address variance reduction problems when several decision-
making entities are involved. When the decisions made by the entities in-
fluence each other, the decision-making is said to be interactive (interde-
pendent). Such problems are termed as game problems. Game problems in
which the state dynamics is given a linear stochastic system with a Brownian
motion and a cost functional that is quadratic in the state and the control, is
often called the linear-quadratic Gaussian (LQG) games. For generic LQG
game problems under perfect state observation, the optimal strategy of the
decision-maker is a linear state-feedback strategy which is identical to an
optimal control for the corresponding deterministic linear-quadratic game
problem where the Brownian motion is replaced by the zero process. More-
over the equilibrium cost only differs from the deterministic game problem’s
equilibrium cost by the integral of a function of time. However, when the
diffusion (volatility) coefficient is state and control-dependent, the structure
of the resulting differential system as well as the equilibrium cost vector are
modified. These results were widely known in both dynamic optimization,
control and game theory literature. For both LQG control and LQG zero-sum
games, it can be shown that a simple square completion method, provides an
explicit solution to the problem. It was successfully developed and applied by
Duncan et al. [4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9] in the mean-field-free case. Moreover, Duncan
et al. have extended the direct method to more general noises including frac-
tional Brownian noises and some non-quadratic cost functionals on spheres
and torus. Inspired by applications in engineering (internet connexion, bat-
tery state etc) and in finance (price, stock option, multi-currency exchange
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etc) were not only Gaussians but also jump processes (Poisson, Le´vy etc)
play important features, the question of extending the framework to linear-
quadratic games under state dynamics driven by jump-diffusion processes
were naturally posed. Adding a Poisson jump and regime switching may al-
low to capture in particular larger jumps which may not be captured by just
increasing diffusion coefficients. Several examples such as multi-currency ex-
change or cloud-server rate allocation on blockchains are naturally in matrix
form.
The main goal of this work is to investigate whether Direct Method can
be used to solve matrix-valued risk-sensitive and adversarial robust mean-
field-type game problems which are non-standard problems [10]. To do so,
we modify the state dynamics to include conditional mean-field terms which
are
• the conditional expectation of the matrix-valued state with respect to
the filtration of the common noise which is a regime switching process,
is added to the drift, diffusion, and jump coefficient functionals.
• the conditional expectation of the matrix-valued control-actions, is in-
cluded in the drift, diffusion, jump coefficient functional.
We also modify the instant cost and terminal cost function to include
• the square of the conditional expectation of the matrix-valued state
and
• the square of the conditional expectation of the matrix-valued control
action.
Involving these features lead to matrix-valued mean-field-type game theory
which focuses on (matrix-valued) games with distribution-dependent quantity-
of-interest such as payoff, cost and state dynamics. It can be seen as the
multiple agent generalization of single agent (matrix-valued) mean-field-type
control problem [10].
If the state dynamics and or the cost functional involve a mean-field
term (such as the expectation of the state and or the expectation of the
control actions), the game is said to be a LQG game of mean-field type, or
MFT-LQG. For such game problems, various solution methods such as the
Stochastic Maximum Principle (SMP) ([10]) and the Dynamic Programming
4
Principle (DPP) with Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs equation and Fokker-
Planck-Kolmogorov equation have been proposed [11, 10, 12].
If the state dynamics and or the cost functional involve a conditional
mean-field term (such as the conditional expectation of the matrix-valued
state and or the conditional expectation of the matrix-valued control actions),
the game is said to be a matrix-valued LQG game of conditional mean-field
type, or cMFT-LQG (or conditional McKean-Vlasov matrix-valued LQG
games). If in addition, the matrix-valued state dynamics is driven by a
matrix-valued jump-diffusion process, then the problem is termed as a cMFT-
LQJD matrix-valued game problem. We aim to study the behavior of such
cMFT-LQJD matrix-valued game problems when conditional mean-field terms
are involved.
Games with global uncertainty and common noise have been widely sug-
gested in the literature. Anonymous sequential and mean-field games with
common noise can be considered as a natural generalization of the mean-field
game problems (see [13, 14] and the references therein). The works in [15, 16]
considered mean-field games with common noise and obtained optimality sys-
tem that determine mean-field equilibria conditioned of the information. The
work in [18, 19] provides sufficiency conditions for well-posedness of mean-
field games with common noise and a major player. Existence of solutions
of the resulting stochastic optimality systems are examined in [17]. A prob-
abilistic approach to the master equation is developed in [43]. In order to
determine the optimal strategies of the decision-maker, the previous works
used a maximum principle or a master equation which involves a stochastic
Fokker-Planck equation (see [19, 20, 21, 22] and the references therein).
Most studies illustrated mean-field game methods in the linear-quadratic
game with infinite number of decision-makers [23, 24, 25, 26, 27]. These
works assume indistinguishability within classes and the cost functionals were
assumed to be identical or invariant per permutation of decision-makers in-
dexes. Note that the indistinguishability assumption is not fulfilled for many
interesting problems such as variance reduction or and risk quantification
problems in which decision-makers have different sensitivity towards the risk.
One typical and practical example is to consider a multi-level building in
which every resident has its own comfort zone temperature and aims to use
the Heating, Ventilating, and Air Conditioning (HVAC) system to be in its
comfort temperature zone and maintain it within its own comfort zone. This
problem clearly does not satisfy the indistinguishability assumption used in
the previous works on mean-field games. Therefore, it is reasonable to look
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at the problem beyond the indistinguishability assumption. Here we drop
these assumptions and dealt with the problem directly with arbitrarily finite
number of decision-makers. In the LQ-mean-field game problems the state
process can be modeled by a set of linear stochastic differential equations of
McKean-Vlasov and the preferences are formalized by quadratic or exponen-
tial of integral of quadratic cost functions with mean-field terms. These game
problems are of practical interests and a detailed exposition of this theory can
be found in [10, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32]. The popularity of these game problems
is due to practical considerations in consensus problems, signal processing,
pattern recognition, filtering, prediction, economics and management science
[20, 33, 34, 35].
To some extent, most of the risk-neutral versions of these optimal con-
trols are analytically and numerically solvable [7, 29, 9, 4, 5]. On the other
hand, the linear quadratic robust setting naturally appears if the decision
makers’ objective is to minimize the effect of a small perturbation and re-
lated variance of the optimally controlled nonlinear process. By solving a
linear quadratic game problem of mean-field type, and using the implied op-
timal control actions, decision-makers can significantly reduce the variance
(and the cost) incurred by this perturbation. The variance reduction and
minmax problems have very interesting applications in risk quantification
problems under adversarial attacks and in security issues in interdependent
infrastructures and networks [37, 36, 38, 35, 39]. In [41], the control for the
evacuation of a multi-level building is designed by means of mean-field games
and mean-field-type control. In [42], electricity price dynamics in the smart
grid is analyzed using a mean-field-type game approach under common noise
which is of diffusion type. Risk-neutral Linear-Quadratic MFT-LQJD games
have been studied for the one dimensional case in [47].
Our contribution
In this paper, we use a simple argument that gives the risk-neutral equilib-
rium strategy and robust adversarial mean-field-type saddle point for a class
of cMFT-LQJD matrix-valued games without use of the well-known solu-
tion methods (SMP and DPP). We apply a basic Itoˆ’s formula following by
a square completion method in the risk-neutral/adversarial mean-field-type
matrix-valued game problems. It is shown that this method is well suited to
cMFT-LQJD risk-neutral/robust games as well as to variance reduction per-
formance functionals with jump-diffusion-regime switching common noise.
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Applying the solution methodology related to the DPP or the SMP requires
involved (stochastic) analysis and convexity arguments to generate necessary
and sufficient optimality criteria. We avoid all this with this method.
Zero-sum stochastic differential games are important class of stochastic
games. The optimality system leads to an Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-Isaacs
(HJBI) system of equations, which is an extension of the HJB equation to
stochastic differential games. When common noise is involved it becomes
a stochastic HJBI system. Obviously, studying well-posedness, existence
and uniqueness of such is a challenging task because of the minmax and
maxmin operators. Usually, upper value and lower value equilibrium payoffs
are investigated. In addition, when conditional mean-field terms are involved
as it is the case here, the system is coupled with a stochastic Fokker-Planck-
Kolmogorov system leading to a master system. Here we provide an easy
way to solve such a system of means of a direct method.
Relationship between risk-sensitive and roust conditional mean-field-type
games are established in the case without jump and with a single regime.
Our contribution can be summarized as follows. We formulate and solve
a matrix-valued linear-quadratic mean-field-type game described by a linear
jump-diffusion dynamics and a mean-field-dependent quadratic cost func-
tional that is conditioned a common noise which includes not only a Brown-
ian motion but also a jump process and regime switching. Since the matrices
are switching dependent, they can be seen as random coefficients. The opti-
mal strategies for the decision-makers are given semi-explicitly using a simple
and direct method based on square completion, suggested in Duncan et al.
in e.g. [6] for the mean-field free case. This approach does not use the well-
known solution methods such as the Stochastic Maximum Principle and the
Dynamic Programming Principle with stochastic Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman-
Isaacs equation and stochastic Fokker-Planck-Kolmogorov equation. It does
require extended stochastic backward-forward partial integro-differential equa-
tions (PIDE) to solve the problem. In the risk-neutral linear-quadratic mean-
field-type game with perfect state observation and with common noise, we
show that, generically there is a minmax strategy to the conditional mean
of the state and provide a sufficient condition of existence of mean-field-type
saddle point. Sufficient conditions for existence and uniqueness of robust
mean-field equilibria are obtained when the horizon length is small enough
and the Riccati coefficients are almost surely positive.
In addition, this work extends the results in [40] in various ways:
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• Extension to matrix-form of arbitrary dimensions.
• the common noise which is a regime switching was not considered in
[40].
• The solution here involves a matrix-valued differential system which
differs from the results in [40].
To solve the aforementioned problem in a semi-explicit way, we follow a
direct method. The method starts by identifying a partial guess functional
where the coefficient functionals are random and regime switching dependent.
Then, it uses Itoˆ’s formula for jump-diffusion-regime switching processes, fol-
lowed by a completion of squares for both control and conditional mean con-
trol. Finally, the processes are identified using an orthogonal decomposition
technique and stochastic differential equations are derived in a semi-explicit
way. The procedure is summarized in Figure 1. The contributions of this
work are summarized in Table 1.
To the best of the authors knowledge this is the first work to consider
regime switching in matrix-valued mean-field-type game theory.
A brief outline of the rest of the paper follows. The next section introduces
a generic game model. After that, the MF-LQJD conditional mean-field-type
game problem is investigated and its solution is presented. The last section
concludes the paper.
Notation and Preliminaries
We introduce the following notations. Let [0, T ], T > 0 be a fixed time hori-
zon and (Ω,F ,FB,N,s,P) be a given filtered probability space.The filtration
F = {FB,N,st , 0 ≤ t ≤ T} is the natural filtration of the union {B,N, s}
augmented by P−null sets of F . In practice, B is used to capture smaller
disturbance and N is used for larger jumps of the system.
An admissible control strategy Ui of the decision-maker i is an F-adapted
and square-integrable process with values in a Ui = Rd×d, d ≥ 1. We denote
the set of all admissible controls by Ui.
2 Problem Formulation
We consider n ≥ 1 decision-makers over the time horizon [0, T ], T > 0. Each
decision-maker i chooses a matrix-valued strategy Ui over the horizon [0, T ].
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Figure 1: Direct method and its key steps.
The state satisfies the following matrix-valued linear jump-diffusion-regime
switching system of mean-field type:
dX = [B1(X − X¯) + (B1 + B¯1)X¯
+
∑n
j=1 B2j(Uj − U¯j) +
∑n
j=1(B2j + B¯2j)U¯j]dt
+S0dB +
∫
θ
M0(·, θ)N˜(dt, dθ),
(1)
where X(t), X¯(t) = E[X(t)|F st ], B1(t, s(t)), B¯1(t, s(t)) ∈ Rd×d, B2j(t, s(t)),
B¯2j(t, s(t)), S0(t, s(t)), M0(t, s(t)) ∈ Rd×d, B is a Rd×d matrix-valued Brown-
ian motion, Ui ∈ Ui, s is a regime switching process with transition rates q˜ss′
satisfying q˜ss′ > 0, q˜ss = −
∑
s′ 6=s q˜ss′ .. N(t, .) is a Rd×d matrix-valued Poisson
random process with compensated process N˜(dt, dθ) = N(dt, dθ)−ν(dθ)dt, ν
is a matrix of Radon measure over the set of jump sizes Θ. F st is the filtration
generated by the regime switching process s. By abuse of notation we omit
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Reference
Cost function Terms [40] this work
risk-neural non-cooperation X, 1D X, matrix-valued
risk-neural full-cooperation X, 1D X, matrix-valued
risk-neural adversarial/robust X, 1D X, matrix-valued
risk-sensitive non-cooperation X, matrix-valued
risk-sensitive full-cooperation X, matrix-valued
risk-sensitive adversarial/robust X, matrix-valued
Drift Terms
B1, B2 X X
B¯1, B¯2 X X
Diffusion Terms
S0 X X
Jump Terms
M0 X X
Switching Term
s X
Cost function Terms
E[X],E[U ] X X
var[X], var[U ] X X
Number of Decision makers
One single team X X
Multiple players X X
Two adversaries X X
Two adversarial teams X
Table 1: Contributions with respect to recent literature.
the use of s(t−) and X(t−) for the left value of switching s(t) and the jump
X(t) respectively.
To the state system (1), we associate the cost functional of decision-maker
i
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Li(X, s, U) = 〈Qi(T, s(T ))(X(T )− X¯(T )), X(T )− X¯(T )〉
+〈(Qi(T, s(T )) + Q¯i(T, s(T )))X¯(T ), X¯(T )〉
+
∫ T
0
〈Qi(X − X¯), X − X¯〉+ 〈(Qi + Q¯i)X¯, X¯〉dt
+
∫ T
0
〈Ri(Ui − U¯i), Ui − U¯i〉+ 〈(Ri + R¯i)U¯i, U¯i〉dt,
(2)
where 〈A,B〉 = trace(A∗B) = trace(B∗A), A∗ being the adjoint operator of
A (transposition), The coefficients Qi := Qi(t, s(t)), Ri := Ri(t, s(t)), Q¯i :=
Q¯i(t, s(t)), R¯i := R¯i(t, s(t)) are possibly time and regime-switching dependent
with values in Rd×d.
The reader may want to know why a matrix-valued dynamics instead of
a vector-valued dynamics. One typical example is the evolution of the rate
of change of blockchain tokens and classical currencies. The exchange rate
between token tk and token tk′ is given by the entries (k, k
′) of X with value
Xkk′ . Since these tokens are correlated one obtains a matrix-valued process
X.
2.1 Risk-Neutral
We provide basic definitions of the risk-neutral problems and their solution
concepts.
Definition 1 (Mean-Field-Type Risk-Neutral Best-Response) Given
(Uj, j 6= i), a risk-neutral best response strategy of decision-maker i is a strat-
egy that solves infUi ELi subject to (1). The set of risk-neutral best responses
of i is denoted by rnBRi(U−i). 
Definition 2 (Mean-Field-Type Risk-Neutral Nash Equilibrium) A
mean-field-type risk-neutral Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (U rnj , j ∈
{1, . . . , n}), of all decision-makers such that for every decision-maker i,
U rni ∈ rnBRi(U rn−i).

Definition 3 (Mean-Field-Type Risk-Neutral Full Cooperation) A mean-
field-type risk-neutral fully cooperative solution is a strategy profile (U rn,gj , j ∈
{1, . . . , n}), of all decision-makers such that
E[L0(X, s, U rn,g)] = inf
(U1,...,Un)
E[L0(X, s, U ],
11
where
L0 :=
n∑
j=1
Lj,
is the social (global) cost. 
Definition 4 (Mean-Field-Type Risk-Neutral Saddle Point Solution )
The set of decision-makers is divided into two teams. A team of defenders
and a team of attackers. The defenders set is
I+ := {i ∈ {1, . . . , n}| Ri  0, (Ri + R¯i)  0}
and the attackers set is
I− := {j ∈ {1, . . . , n}| −Rj  0, −(Rj + R¯j)  0}.
A mean-field-type risk-neutral saddle point is a strategy profile (Uadj , j ∈ I+),
of the team of defenders and (Uadj , j ∈ I−) of the team of attackers such that
Lad(X, s, (Uadi )i∈I+ , (Uj)j∈I−) ≤ Lad(X, s, Uad)
≤ Lad(X, s, (Ui)i∈I+ , (Uadj )j∈I−)
and Lad(X, s, Uad) is the value of the adversarial team (risk-neutral) game,
where
Lad(X, s, U)
:= 〈Q(T, s(T ))(X(T )− X¯(T )), X(T )− X¯(T )〉
+〈(Q(T, s(T )) + Q¯(T, s(T )))X¯(T ), X¯(T )〉
+
∫ T
0
〈Q(X − X¯), X − X¯〉+ 〈(Q+ Q¯)X¯, X¯〉dt
+
∫ T
0
∑n
i=1〈Ri(Ui − U¯i), Ui − U¯i〉
+
∑n
i=1〈(Ri + R¯i)U¯i, U¯i〉dt.

2.2 Risk-Sensitive
We provide basic definitions of risk-sensitive problems and their solution
concepts.
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Definition 5 (Mean-Field-Type Risk-Sensitive Best-Response) Given
(Uj, j 6= i), a risk-sensitive best response strategy of decision-maker i is a
strategy that solves
inf
Ui
1
λi
log
(
E[eλiLi ]
)
,
subject to (1). The set of risk-sensitive best responses of i is denoted by
rsBRi(U−i). 
For λi 6= 0, the risk-sensitive loss functional
1
λi
log
(
E[eλiLi ]
)
includes not only the first moment E[Li] but also all the higher moments
E[Lki ], k ≥ 1.
Definition 6 (Mean-Field-Type Risk-Sensitive Nash Equilibrium )
A mean-field-type risk-sensitive Nash equilibrium is a strategy profile (U rsj , j ∈
{1, . . . , n}), of all decision-makers such that for every decision-maker i,
U rsi ∈ rsBRi(U rs−i).

Definition 7 (Mean-Field-Type Risk-Sensitive Full Cooperation) A
mean-field-type risk-sensitive fully cooperative solution is a strategy profile
(U rs,gj , j ∈ {1, . . . , n}), of all decision-makers such that
inf
(U1,...,Un)
1
λ
log
[
EeλL0(X,s,U)
]
=
1
λ
log
[
EeλL0(X,s,Urs,g)
]
,
Definition 8 (Mean-Field-Type Risk-Sensitive Saddle Point Solution )
The set of decision-makers is divided into two teams. A team of defenders
and a team of attackers. The defenders set is I+ := {i ∈ {1, . . . , n}| Ri 
0, (Ri + R¯i)  0} and the attackers set is I− := {j ∈ {1, . . . , n}| − Rj 
0, −(Rj + R¯j)  0}. A mean-field-type risk-sensitive saddle point is a strat-
egy profile (Uadj , j ∈ I+), of the team of defenders and (Uadj , j ∈ I−) of the
team of attackers such that
1
λ
log
[
EeλL
ad(X,s,(Uadi )i∈I+ ,(Uj)j∈I− )
]
≤ 1
λ
log
[
EeλLad(X,s,Uad)
]
≤ 1
λ
log
[
EeλL
ad(X,s,(Ui)i∈I+ ,(U
ad
j )j∈I− )
]
.
13
3 Main Results
This section presents the main results of the article.
3.1 Risk-Neutral Case
We start with the risk-neutral Nash equilibrium problem.
Theorem 1 Assume that Qi, Ri, Qi+Q¯i, Ri+R¯i are symmetric positive def-
inite. Then the matrix-valued mean-field-type (risk-neutral) Nash equilibrium
strategy and the (risk-neutral) equilibrium cost are given by:
U rni − U¯ rni = −12R−1i B∗2i(P ∗i + Pi)(X − X¯),
U¯ rni = −12(Ri + R¯i)−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)X¯,
Lrni (X, s, U
rn) = E〈Pi(0, s(0))(X0 − X¯0), X0 − X¯0〉
+E〈P¯i(0, s(0))X¯0, X¯0〉+ E[δi(0, s(0))],
i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
where Pi, P¯i, and δi solve the following differential equations:
P˙i +Qi + PiB1 +B
∗
1Pi +
∑
s′ 6=s(Pi(t, s
′)− Pi(t, s))q˜ss′
−1
4
(P ∗i + Pi)B2iR
− 1
2
∗
i R
− 1
2
i B
∗
2i(P
∗
i + Pi)
−1
4
∑
j 6=i(P
∗
j + Pj)B2jR
−1∗
j B
∗
2j(P
∗
i + Pi)
−1
4
∑
j 6=i(P
∗
i + Pi)B2jR
−1∗
j B
∗
2j(P
∗
j + Pj) = 0,
Pi(T, s) = Qi(T, s),
˙¯Pi +Qi + Q¯i + P (B1 + B¯1) + (B1 + B¯1)
∗Pi
+
∑
s′ 6=s(P¯i(t, s
′)− P¯i(t, s))q˜ss′
−1
4
(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)(B2i + B¯2i)(Ri + R¯i)
− 1
2
∗(Ri + R¯i)−
1
2
(B2i + B¯2i)
∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)
−1
4
∑
j 6=i(P¯
∗
j + P¯j)
∗(B2j + B¯2j)(Rj + R¯j)−1∗
(B2j + B¯2j)
∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)
−1
4
∑
j 6=i(P¯
∗
i + P¯i)(B2j + B¯2j)(Rj + R¯j)
−1∗
(B2j + B¯2j)
∗(P¯ ∗j + P¯j) = 0,
P¯i(T, s) = Qi(T, s) + Q¯i(T, s),
δ˙i +
1
2
〈(P ∗i + Pi)S0, S0〉+ 12
∫
Θ
〈(P ∗i + Pi)M0,M0ν(dθ)〉
+
∑
s′ 6=s(δi(t, s
′)− δi(t, s))q˜ss′ = 0,
δi(T, s) = 0,
∀s ∈ S,
(3)
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whenever these differential equations have a unique solution that does not
blow up within [0, T ]. 
Under the symmetric matrix assumption above, it is easy to check that if P
is a solution then P ∗ is also a solution. Therefore P ∗i (t, s) = Pi(t, s), (t, s) ∈
[0, T ]× S.
From the state system (1), the conditional expected matrix X¯(t) :=
E[X(t)|F st ], where F s is the natural filtration of the regime switching process
s up to t, solves the following system:
dX¯ = [(B1 + B¯1)X¯ +
∑n
j=1(B2j + B¯2j)U¯j]dt,
X¯(0) = E[X0].
which means that
dX¯ = [(B1 + B¯1)− 12
∑n
j=1(B2j + B¯2j)(Rj + R¯j)
−1
(B2j + B¯2j)
∗(P¯ ∗j + P¯j)]X¯dt,
X¯(0) = E[X0],
which will be used for feedback in the optimal strategy. Next, we provide a
semi-explicit solution to the full-cooperation case.
Corollary 1 Assume that Q0 :=
∑n
j=1Qj, Q0+Q¯0 :=
∑n
j=1[Qj+Q¯j], Ri, Ri+
R¯i are symmetric positive definite. The fully cooperative solution of the prob-
lem inf(U1,...,Un) E[
∑n
j=1 Lj] is given by

U rn,gi − U¯ rn,gi = −R−1i B∗2iP0(X − X¯),
U¯ rn,gi = −(Ri + R¯i)−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗P¯0X¯,
Lrn,g0 (X, s, U
rn,g) = E〈P0(0, s(0))(X0 − X¯0), X0 − X¯0〉
+E〈P¯0(0, s(0))X¯0, X¯0〉+ E[δ0(0, s(0))],
i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
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where P0, P¯0, and δ0 solve the following differential equations:
P˙0 +Q0 + P0B1 +B
∗
1P0 +
∑
s′ 6=s(P0(t, s
′)− P0(t, s))q˜ss′
−P0
[∑n
i=1B2iR
−1
i B
∗
2i
]
P0 = 0,
P0(T, s) = Q0(T, s),
˙¯P0 +Q0 + Q¯0 + P¯0(B1 + B¯1) + (B1 + B¯1)
∗P¯0
+
∑
s′ 6=s(P¯0(t, s
′)− P¯0(t, s))q˜ss′
−P¯0
[∑n
i=1(B2i + B¯2i)(Ri + R¯i)
−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗
]
P¯0 = 0,
P¯0(T, s) = Q0(T, s) + Q¯0(T, s),
δ˙0 + 〈P0S0, S0〉+
∫
Θ
〈P0M0,M0ν(dθ)〉
+
∑
s′ 6=s(δ0(t, s
′)− δ0(t, s))q˜ss′ = 0,
δ0(T, s) = 0,
∀s ∈ S.
(4)
Notice that these Riccati equations have positive solution P0, P¯0, and δ0 and
there is no blow up in [0, T ]. 
The proof of Corollary 1 is immediate from Theorem 1 by one single team
and with a choice vector of matrices U = (Ui)i∈I .
Corollary 2 Assume that Q,Q+ Q¯, Ri, Ri + R¯i are symmetric positive def-
inite for i ∈ I+ and −Rj,−(Rj + R¯j) are symmetric positive definite for
j ∈ I−. We assume that I+ ∪ I− = I. The adversarial game problem of the
team attackers I− and the team of defenders I+ has a saddle and it is given
by

Uadi − U¯adi = −R−1i B∗2iP ad(X − X¯),
U¯adi = −(Ri + R¯i)−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗P¯ adX¯, i ∈ I+,
V adj − V¯ adj = −R−1j B∗2jP ad(X − X¯), j ∈ I−,
V¯ adj = −(Rj + R¯j)−1(B2j + B¯2j)∗P¯ adX¯, j ∈ I−,
Lad(X, s, Uad) = E〈P ad(0, s(0))(X0 − X¯0), X0 − X¯0〉
+E〈P¯ ad(0, s(0))X¯0, X¯0〉+ E[δad(0, s(0))],
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where P ad, P¯ ad, and δad solve the following differential equations:
P˙ +Q+ PB1 +B
∗
1P +
∑
s′ 6=s(P (t, s
′)− P (t, s))q˜ss′
−P
[∑
i∈I+ B2iR
−1
i B
∗
2i +
∑
j∈I− B2jR
−1
j B
∗
2j
]
P = 0,
P (T, s) = Q(T, s),
˙¯P +Q+ Q¯+ P¯ (B1 + B¯1) + (B1 + B¯1)
∗P¯
+
∑
s′ 6=s(P¯ (t, s
′)− P¯ (t, s))q˜ss′
−P¯
[∑
i∈I+(B2i + B¯2i)(Ri + R¯i)
−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗
+
∑
j∈I−(B2j + B¯2j)(Rj + R¯j)
−1(B2j + B¯2j)∗
]
P¯ = 0,
P¯ (T, s) = Q(T, s) + Q¯(T, s),
δ˙ + 〈PS0, S0〉+
∫
Θ
〈PM0,M0ν(dθ)〉
+
∑
s′ 6=s(δ(t, s
′)− δ(t, s))q˜ss′ = 0,
δ(T, s) = 0,
∀s ∈ S.
(5)

The proof of Corollary 2 is immediate from Theorem 1 by considering two
adversarial teams and with choice vector of matrices U+ = (Ui)i∈I+ and
U− = (Ui)i∈I− respectively.
Notice that the Riccati equations in (9) have positive definite solution
P ad if in addition[∑
i∈I+ B2iR
−1
i B
∗
2i +
∑
j∈I− B2jR
−1
j B
∗
2j
]
 0,
which does not blow up within [0, T ], and positive solution P¯ ad if in addition
[∑
i∈I+(B2i + B¯2i)(Ri + R¯i)
−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗
+
∑
j∈I−(B2j + B¯2j)(Rj + R¯j)
−1(B2j + B¯2j)∗
]
 0,
within [0, T ]. Next, we study the risk-sensitive case and point out some facts
regarding the comparison of its solution with respect to the risk-neutral case
as the risk-sensitivity index vanishes.
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3.2 Risk-Sensitive Case
A risk averse decision-maker (with cost functional) is a decision-maker who
prefers higher cost with known risks rather than lower cost with unknown
risks. In other words, among various control strategies giving the same cost
with different level of risks, this decision-maker always prefers the alternative
with the lowest risk.
When M0 6= 0 the exponential martingale of compensated Poisson ran-
dom process times a linear process yields to an exponential non-quadratic
terms Eexp[
∫ T
0
∫
Θ
〈(P ∗i + Pi)(X − X¯),M0N˜(dt, dθ)〉] has an exponential non-
quadratic term. Therefore we consider the risk-sensitive case when M0 van-
ishes (no Poisson jump) and a single regime S = {s0}. When λi > 0 the
decision-maker i is risk-averse and when λi < 0 is risk-seeking. As λi goes
to zero, decision-maker i becomes a risk-neutral decision-maker. The best
response problem of decision-maker i is well-posed only for λi ≤ λ¯i where λ¯i
will be determined from the solution region of the differential system derived
below.
Theorem 2 Assume that Qi, Ri, Qi + Q¯i, Ri + R¯i are symmetric positive
definite. There is no jump M0 = 0 and a single regime S = {s0}. Then the
matrix-valued mean-field-type (risk-sensitive) Nash equilibrium strategy and
the (risk-sensitive) equilibrium cost are given by:
U rsi − U¯ rsi = −R−1i B∗2iP rsi (X − X¯),
U¯ rsi = −(Ri + R¯i)−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗P¯iX¯,
Lrsi (X, s, U
rs)
= 1
λi
logE exp{λi[〈P rsi (0, s(0))(X0 − X¯0), X0 − X¯0〉
+〈P¯i(0, s(0))X¯0, X¯0〉+ δrsi (0, s(0))]},
i ∈ {1, . . . , n},
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where P rsi , P¯
rs
i = P¯i, and δ
rs
i solve the following differential equations:
P˙i +Qi + PiB
∗
1 +B1Pi
−Pi[B2iR−1i B∗2i − 2λiS0S∗0 ]Pi
−∑j 6=i PjB2jR−1∗j B∗2jPi −∑j 6=i PiB2jR−1∗j B∗2jPj = 0,
Pi(T, s) = Qi(T, s),
˙¯Pi +Qi + Q¯i + P¯i(B1 + B¯1)
∗ + (B1 + B¯1)P¯i
−P¯i[(B2i + B¯2i)(Ri + R¯i)−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗]P¯i
−∑j 6=i P¯j(B2j + B¯2j)(Rj + R¯j)−1∗(B2j + B¯2j)∗P¯i
−∑j 6=i P¯i(B2j + B¯2j)(Rj + R¯j)−1∗(B2j + B¯2j)∗P¯j = 0,
P¯i(T, s) = Qi(T, s) + Q¯i(T, s),
δ˙i + 〈PiS0, S0〉 = 0, δi(T, s) = 0,
∀s ∈ S,
(6)
whenever these differential system of equations have a unique solution that
does not blow up in [0, T ]. 
As all λi vanish, the matrix-valued differential system (6) becomes the
risk-neutral system (8) above, and the risk-sensitive optimal strategy coin-
cides with the risk-neutral one. A bound for λ¯i can be obtained from the
positivity condition of the matrices
[B2iR
−1
i B
∗
2i − 2λiS0S∗0 ]  0. (7)
Note that P¯ rsi = P¯i because this coefficient is associated with the term 〈X¯, X¯〉
which is independent of the Brownian motion.
Consider a finite population of decision-makers I := {1, . . . n} is classified
as follows:
• risk-neutral decision-makers: I0 = {i ∈ {1, . . . n} | λi → 0}
• risk-averse decision-makers: I+ = {i | λi > 0}
• risk-seeking decision-makers: I− = {i | λi < 0}
Corollary 3 A mixture of risk-neutral, risk-seeking and risk-averse are ob-
tained solving the following system:
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
i ∈ I0 :
P˙i +Qi + PiB
∗
1 +B1Pi
−PiB2iR−1i B∗2iPi −
∑
j 6=i PjB2jR
−1∗
j B
∗
2jPi
−∑j 6=i PiB2jR−1∗j B∗2jPj = 0,
i ∈ I+ :
P˙i +Qi + PiB
∗
1 +B1Pi
−Pi[B2iR−1i B∗2i − 2λiS0S∗0 ]Pi
−∑j 6=i PjB2jR−1∗j B∗2jPi
−∑j 6=i PiB2jR−1∗j B∗2jPj = 0,
i ∈ I− :
P˙i +Qi + PiB
∗
1 +B1Pi
−Pi[B2iR−1i B∗2i + 2(−λi)S0S∗0 ]Pi
−∑j 6=i PjB2jR−1∗j B∗2jPi
−∑j 6=i PiB2jR−1∗j B∗2jPj = 0,
Pi(T, s) = Qi(T, s), i ∈ I,
∀s ∈ S.
Corollary 4 Assume that Q0 :=
∑n
j=1Qi, Q0+Q¯0 :=
∑n
j=1[Qi,+Q¯i], Ri, Ri+
R¯i are symmetric positive definite. The risk-sensitive fully cooperative solu-
tion of the problem inf(U1,...,Un)
1
λ
logE[eλ
∑n
j=1 Lj ] is given by

U rs,gi − U¯ rs,gi = −R−1i B∗2iP rs,g0 (X − X¯),
U¯ rs,gi = −(Ri + R¯i)−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗P¯0X¯,
Lrs,g0 (X, s, U
rs,g)
= 1
λ
logE exp{λ[〈P rs,g0 (0, s(0))(X0 − X¯0), X0 − X¯0〉
+〈P¯0(0, s(0))X¯0, X¯0〉+ δrs,g0 (0, s(0))]},
i ∈ I,
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where P rs,g0 , P¯
rs,g
0 = P¯0, and δ
rs,g
0 solve the following differential equations:
P˙0 +Q0 + P0B1 +B
∗
1P0
−P0
[∑n
i=1B2iR
−1
i B
∗
2i − 2λS0S∗0
]
P0 = 0,
P0(T, s) = Q0(T, s),
˙¯P0 +Q0 + Q¯0 + P¯0(B1 + B¯1) + (B1 + B¯1)
∗P¯0
−P¯0
[∑n
i=1(B2i + B¯2i)(Ri + R¯i)
−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗
]
P¯0 = 0,
P¯0(T, s) = Q0(T, s) + Q¯0(T, s),
δ˙0 + 〈P0S0, S0〉 = 0, δ0(T, s) = 0,
∀s ∈ S.
(8)

Remark 1 (Shared-Risk Situation) Notice that the bound λ¯ is obtained from
the positivity condition
∑n
i=1 B2iR
−1
i B
∗
2i − 2λS0S∗0  0. Hence, the risk con-
dition is relaxed thanks to the full cooperation in comparison with the non-
cooperative risk consideration, i.e.,
λ¯ = sup
{
λ| full cooperation risk-sensitive
problem is well-posed
}
,
λ¯i = sup
{
λi| non-cooperative risk-sensitiveproblem is well-posed
}
,
where
B2iR
−1
i B
∗
2i  2λiS0S0, (from (7)),∑n
i=1B2iR
−1
i B
∗
2i  2
∑n
i=1 λiS0S0,
therefore, it is concluded that
∑n
i=1 λ¯i ≤ λ¯. Full cooperation increases the
well-posedness domain by means shared risk. 
Corollary 5 Assume that Q,Q+ Q¯, Ri, Ri + R¯i are symmetric positive def-
inite for i ∈ I+ and −Rj,−(Rj + R¯j) are symmetric positive definite for
j ∈ I−. We assume that I+ ∪ I− = I. The adversarial risk-sensitive game
problem of the team attackers I− and the team of defenders I+ has a saddle
and it is given by
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
U rs,adi − U¯ rs,adi = −R−1i B∗2iP rs,ad(X − X¯),
U¯ rs,adi = −(Ri + R¯i)−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗P¯ rs,adX¯, i ∈ I+,
V rs,adj − V¯ rs,adj = −R−1j B∗2jP rs,ad(X − X¯),
V¯ rs,adj = −(Rj + R¯j)−1(B2j + B¯2j)∗P¯ rs,adX¯, j ∈ I−,
Lad(X, s, Uad) = E〈P rs,ad(0, s(0))(X0 − X¯0), X0 − X¯0〉
+E〈P¯ ad(0, s(0))X¯0, X¯0〉+ E[δrs,ad(0, s(0))],
where P rs,ad, P¯ rs,ad = P¯ ad, and δrs,ad solve the following differential equations:
P˙ +Q+ PB1 +B
∗
1P +
∑
s′ 6=s(P (t, s
′)− P (t, s))q˜ss′
−P
[∑
i∈I+ B2iR
−1
i B
∗
2i
+
∑
j∈I− B2jR
−1
j B
∗
2j − 2λS0S∗0
]
P = 0,
P (T, s) = Q(T, s),
˙¯P +Q+ Q¯+ P¯ (B1 + B¯1) + (B1 + B¯1)
∗P¯
+
∑
s′ 6=s(P¯ (t, s
′)− P¯ (t, s))q˜ss′
−P¯
[∑
i∈I+(B2i + B¯2i)(Ri + R¯i)
−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗
+
∑
j∈I−(B2j + B¯2j)(Rj + R¯j)
−1(B2j + B¯2j)∗
−2λS0S∗0
]
P¯ = 0,
P¯ (T, s) = Q(T, s) + Q¯(T, s),
δ˙ + 〈PS0, S0〉+
∑
s′ 6=s(δ(t, s
′)− δ(t, s))q˜ss′ = 0,
δ(T, s) = 0,
∀s ∈ S.
(9)

Notice that these risk-sensitive adversarial Riccati equations have positive
definite solution P rs,ad if in addition[∑
i∈I+ B2iR
−1
i B
∗
2i +
∑
j∈I− B2jR
−1
j B
∗
2j − 2λS0S∗0
]
 0,
which does not blow up within [0, T ].
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4 Relationship Between Adversarial and Risk-
Sensitive Game Problem
We discuss the relationship between the solutions obtained from an adver-
sarial game problem and the risk-sensitive game problem when there is no
jump and a single regime.
4.1 Mean-Field-Free Control
Consider the following risk-sensitive control problem with λ > 0:
Lrs(Xrs, s, U rs) = 1
λ
log
[
EeλL(Xrs,s,Urs)
]
,
infUrs L
rs(Xrs, s, U rs)
s.t. dXrs = [B1X
rs +B2U
rs]dt+ S0dB,
X(0) = X0, s(0) = s0
where
L(Xrs, s, U rs) = 〈Q(T, s(T ))Xrs(T ), Xrs(T )〉
+
∫ T
0
〈QXrs, Xrs〉dt+ ∫ T
0
〈RU rs, U rs〉dt,
Its solution is given by:
U rs = −R−1B∗2P rsXrs,
Lrs(Xrs, s, U rs)
= 1
λ
logE exp{λ[〈P rs0 (0, s(0))Xrs0 , Xrs0 〉+ δrs0 (0, s(0))]},
Now consider the following adversarial risk-neutral control problem:
infUad supV ad E[Lad(U, V )],
s. t. dXad =
[
B1X
ad +B2U
ad +
[√
2λS0[−R˜] 12
]
V ad
]
dt
+S0dB,
with
Lad(Xad, s, Uad) = L(Xad, s, Uad) +
∫ T
0
〈R˜V ad, V ad〉dt,
where R˜ ≺ 0. Its explicit solution is given by
Uad = −R−1B∗2P adXad,
V ad =
√
2λ[−R˜]− 12S∗0P adXad,
Lad(Xad, s, Uad) = E〈P ad(0, s(0))Xad0 , Xad0 〉
+E[δad(0, s(0))]
23
the coefficients P ad and P rs solve the same differential system which is given
by
P˙ +Q+ PB1 +B
∗
1P − P
[
B2R
−1B∗2 − 2λS0S∗0
]
P = 0,
P (T, s) = Q(T, s),
However, the evolution of the system states Xrs and Xad may not have the
same probability law even if they start at the same initial random variable
X0. When X0 is a deterministic matrix and S is a singleton, the two optimal
costs Lad and Lrs coincide. In general, these costs are different.
By taking the expectation, it follows that
dX¯rs = [B1 −B2R−1B∗2P ]X¯rsdt, and
dX¯ad = [B1 − (B2R−1B∗2 − 2λS0S∗0)P ]X¯addt
Hence
X¯ad(t) = X¯rs(t)e2λ
∫ t
0 S0S
∗
0P (t
′)dt′ ,
We conclude that the first moments of the two problems are different for
λS0S
∗
0 6= 0 and EX0 6= 0. This means that, in a problem the first moment is
involved in the cost, the mean of the mean-field trajectory of risk-sensitive
and robust design are not necessary equal. Below we show that one can
modify the robust control law such that the first moment of these designs
are equal. It will be achieved by means of mean-field-type robust control.
4.2 Mean-Field-Free Team
Consider the following risk-sensitive team problem with team members in I+
:
infUrs
1
λ
log
[
EeλLteam(Xrs,s,Urs)
]
,
s. t. dXrs = [B1X
rs +
∑
i∈I+ B2iU
rs
i ]dt+ S0dB,
where
Lteam(X
rs, s, U rs) = 〈Q(T, s(T ))Xrs(T ), Xrs(T )〉
+
∫ T
0
〈QXrs, Xrs〉dt+ ∫ T
0
∑
i∈I+〈RiU rsi , U rsi 〉dt,
Its solution is given by:
U rsi = −R−1i B∗2iP rsXrs,
Lrsteam(X
rs, s, U rs)
= 1
λ
logE exp{λ[〈P rs0 (0, s(0))Xrs0 , Xrs0 〉+ δrs0 (0, s(0))]}.
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We now design the following adversarial risk-neutral game problem with
two teams in I+ and I− respectively
infUad supV ad E[Ladteam(U, V )],
s. t. dXad =
[
B1X
ad +
∑
i∈I+ B2iU
ad
+|I−|−1
∑
j∈I−
[√
2λS0[−R˜j] 12
]
V adj
]
dt+ S0dB,
with
Ladteam(X
ad, s, Uad) = 〈Q(T, s(T ))Xad(T ), Xad(T )〉
+
∫ T
0
〈QXad, Xad〉dt+ ∫ T
0
∑
i∈I+〈RiUadi , Uadi 〉dt
+
∫ T
0
∑
j∈I−〈R˜jV adj , V adj 〉dt,
R˜j ≺ 0, j ∈ I−. Its explicit solution is given by
Uadi = −R−1i B∗2iP adXad,
V adj =
√
2λ[−R˜]
1
2
j S
∗
0P
adXad,
Ladteam(X
ad, s, Uad) = E〈P ad(0, s(0))Xad0 , Xad0 〉
+E[δad(0, s(0))].
The coefficients P ad and P rs solve the same differential equation which is
given by
P˙ +Q+ PB1 +B
∗
1P
−P
[∑
i∈I+ B2iR
−1
i B
∗
2i − 2λS0S∗0
]
P = 0,
P (T, s) = Q(T, s),
The risk-sensitive optimal control U rs and the risk-neutral adversarial team
optimal strategy U rs are the similar structure. However the probability law
of the system states Xrs and Xad may be different even when they start from
the same initial random variable X0.
4.3 Mean-Field-Type Team Problem
We now examine possible relationship between risk-sensitive team (full co-
operation) and robust team game in the mean-field dependent case. Con-
sider the following risk-sensitive mean-field-type team problem, involving the
teams I+:
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infUrs
1
λ
log
[
EeλLteam(X,s,Urs)
]
,
s. t. dX = [B1(X − X¯) + (B1 + B¯1)X¯
+
∑
i∈I+ B2i(Ui − U¯i) +
∑
i∈I+(B2i + B¯2i)U¯i]dt
+S0dB,
where
Lteam(X, s, (Ui)i∈I+)
= 〈Q(T, s(T ))(X(T )− X¯(T )), X(T )− X¯(T )〉
+〈(Q(T, s(T ) + Q¯(T, s(T ))X¯(T ), X¯(T )〉
+
∫ T
0
〈Q(X − X¯), X − X¯〉dt
+
∫ T
0
〈(Q+ Q¯)X¯, X¯〉dt+ ∫ T
0
∑
i∈I+〈Ri(Ui − U¯i), Ui − U¯i〉dt
+
∫ T
0
∑
i∈I+〈(Ri + R¯i)U¯i, U¯i〉dt.
Its solution is given by
U rsi − U¯ rsi = −R−1i B∗2iP rs(Xrs − X¯rs),
U¯ rsi = −(Ri + R¯i)−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗P¯ rsX¯rs,
Lrsteam(X
rs, s, U rs)
= 1
λ
logE exp{λ[〈P rs(0, s(0))(Xrs0 − X¯rs0 ), Xrs0 − X¯rs0 〉
+〈P¯ rs(0, s(0))X¯rs0 , X¯rs0 〉+ δrs0 (0, s(0))]},
i ∈ I+.
We design the following adversarial risk-neutral mean-field-type game prob-
lem with two teams in I+ and I−:
infUad supV ad E[Ladteam(U, V )],
s. t. dXad = [B1(X
ad − X¯ad) + (B1 + B¯1)X¯ad
+
∑
i∈I+ B2i(U
ad
i − U¯adi ) +
∑
i∈I+(B2i + B¯2i)U¯
ad
i
+|I−|−1
∑
j∈I−
√
2λS0[−R˜j] 12 (V adj − V¯ adj )]dt+ S0dB,
with
Ladteam(X
ad, s, Uad) = Lteam(X
ad, s, Uad)
+
∫ T
0
∑
j∈I−〈R˜j(V adj − V¯ adj ), V adj − V¯ adj 〉dt,
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with R˜j ≺ 0. Its explicit solution is given by
Uadi − U¯adi = −R−1i B∗2iP ad(Xad − X¯ad),
U¯adi = −(Ri + R¯i)−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗P¯ adX¯ad, i ∈ I+,
V adj − V¯ adj =
√
2λ[−R˜j]− 12S∗0P ad(Xad − X¯ad), j ∈ I−,
V¯ adj = 0,
Lad(Xad, s, Uad)
= E〈P ad(0, s(0))(Xad0 − X¯ad0 ), Xad0 − X¯ad0 〉
+E〈P¯ ad(0, s(0))X¯ad0 , X¯ad0 〉+ E[δad(0, s(0))],
Thus, it is obtained that P rs and P ad solve the same equation
P˙ +Q+ PB1 +B
∗
1P
−P
[∑
i∈I+ B2iR
−1
i B
∗
2i − 2λS0S∗0
]
P = 0,
and P¯ rs and P¯ ad solve the same equation
˙¯P +Q+ Q¯+ P¯ (B1 + B¯1) + (B1 + B¯1)
∗P¯
−P¯
[∑
i∈I+(B2i + B¯2i)(Ri + R¯i)
−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗
]
P¯ = 0.
In contrast to the mean-field free cases above, mean-field-type robust design
provides an interesting feature: the expectation of the states of the two
problems coincide: X¯rs = X¯ad, and solve the following ODE:
dX¯ = [(B1 + B¯1)
−∑i∈I+(B2i + B¯2i)(Ri + R¯i)−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗P¯ ]X¯dt,
X¯(0) = E[Xrs0 ] = E[Xad0 ].
This means that when facing a risk-sensitive problem, the ”true” team decision-
maker can design a robust control law of mean-field type such that V adj =√
2λ[−R˜j]− 12S∗0P ad(Xad− X¯ad), j ∈ I−. Moreover this robust control law of
mean-field type preserves the mean trajectory of the states because EV adj = 0.
4.4 Mean-Field-Type Game Problem
We now discuss the relationship between robustness and risk-sensitivity in the
context of games. Consider the risk-sensitive mean-field-type game problem
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given by
infUi∈Ui
1
λi
log
[
EeλiLi(X,s,U)
]
,
s.t. dX = [B1(X − X¯) + (B1 + B¯1)X¯
+
∑n
j=1 B2j(Uj − U¯j) +
∑n
j=1(B2j + B¯2j)U¯j]dt+ S0dB,
where λi > 0, Li(X, s, U) is the cost presented in (2). Hence, by Theorem 2
it follows that the solution is given by
Ui = −R−1i B∗2iP rsi (X − X¯)
−(Ri + R¯i)−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗P¯ rsi X¯,
We design the following robust mean-field-type game problem in which
each ”true” decision-maker i of the game above can also treat the risk as a
fictitious adversary ik who picks a robust control strategy Vik.
infUi∈Ui
[
supVik L
ad
i (X, s, U, V )
]
s.t. dX = [B1(X − X¯) + (B1 + B¯1)X¯
+
∑n
i=1B2i(Ui − U¯i) +
∑n
i=1(B2i + B¯2i)U¯i]dt
+S0dB +
∑n
i=1
√
2λiS0[−R˜ik] 12 (Vik − V¯ik)dt,
−R˜ik  0,
where Li(X, s, U) is the cost presented in (2), the robust cost functional
Ladi (X, s, U, V ) =
Li(X, s, U) +
∫ T
0
∑n
i=1〈R˜ik(Vik − V¯ik), Vik − V¯ik〉dt
+
∫ T
0
∑n
i=1〈(R˜ik + ˜¯Rik)V¯ik, V¯ik〉dt,
−(R˜ik + ˜¯Rik)  0,
Hence, by Theorem 2 it follows that the solution is given by:
Uadi = −R−1i B∗2iP adi (Xad − X¯ad)
−(Ri + R¯i)−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗P¯ adi X¯ad,
V adik = −R˜−1ik B∗2ikP adi (Xad − X¯ad),
V¯ adik = 0,
The coefficients P rsi and P
ad
i solve the corresponding differential equation
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presented next:
P˙i +Qi + PiB
∗
1 +B1Pi
−Pi[B2iR−1i B∗2i − 2λiS0S∗0 ]Pi
−∑j 6=i PjB2jR−1∗j B∗2jPi
−∑j 6=i PiB2jR−1∗j B∗2jPj = 0,
Pi(T, s) = Qi(T, s),
˙¯Pi +Qi + Q¯i + P¯i(B1 + B¯1)
∗ + (B1 + B¯1)P¯i
−P¯i[(B2i + B¯2i)(Ri + R¯i)−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗]P¯i
−∑j 6=i P¯j(B2j + B¯2j)(Rj + R¯j)−1∗(B2j + B¯2j)∗P¯i
−∑j 6=i P¯i(B2j + B¯2j)(Rj + R¯j)−1∗(B2j + B¯2j)∗P¯j = 0,
P¯i(T, s) = Qi(T, s) + Q¯i(T, s).
Moreover, the expected matrix-value of the states X¯rs and X¯ad coincides.
This result is very interesting because it says that for this class of risk-
sensitive mean-field-type game problem, one can design a risk-neutral robust
mean-field-type control strategy that preserves the mean trajectory in ad-
dition of sharing similar equilibrium control law structures. The optimal
control laws of the fictitious adversaries V adik satisfies EV adik = V¯ adik = 0. By
choosing the following specific design
S0 =
√
µD,
−R˜i = γ2i Id×d  0,
γi
√
2λiµ = 1,
(10)
the robust mean-field-type game yields
Ladi (X, s, U, V ) =
Li(X, s, U)− γ2i
∫ T
0
〈(Vik − V¯ik), Vik − V¯ik〉dt,
dX = [B1(X − X¯) + (B1 + B¯1)X¯
+
∑n
i=1B2i(Ui − U¯i) +
∑n
i=1(B2i + B¯2i)U¯i]dt
+
√
µDdB +
∑n
i=1D(Vik − V¯ik)dt,
(11)
Hence we retrieve a modified version of the robust control design of risk-
sensitive mean-field games proposed in [27]. In contrast to [27] where the
mean trajectories X¯rs and X¯ad can be different, here, thanks to the mean-field
term (Vik − V¯ik) the resulting mean of mean-field terms of the two problems
coincide. This new result is due to variance reduction design 〈(Vik−V¯ik), Vik−
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V¯ik〉. The fictitious adversary control law can be seen as a noise (zero mean):
EV adik = 0 by setting
dB˜ =
√
µDdB +
n∑
i=1
D(Vik − V¯ik)dt,
Table 3 below summarizes some relationships between the two problems.
5 Proof of the Main Results
5.1 Proof of the risk-neutral case (Theorem 1)
First, inspired from the form of the cost function consider the following guess
functional:
Fi(t, s,X) = 〈Pi(X − X¯), X − X¯〉+ 〈P¯iX¯, X¯〉+ δi.
Taking the expectation of Itoˆ’s formula applied to Fi yields
E[dFi] = E
[
〈P˙i(X − X¯), X − X¯〉+ 〈 ˙¯PiX¯, X¯〉+ δ˙i
+〈(P ∗i + Pi)(X − X¯),
B1(X(t)− X¯(t)) +
∑n
j=1 B2j(Uj − U¯j)〉
+〈(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)X¯, (B1 + B¯1)X¯(t) +
∑n
j=1(B2j + B¯2j)U¯j〉
+1
2
〈(P ∗i + Pi)S0, S0〉+ 12
∫
Θ
〈(P ∗i + Pi)M0,M0ν(dθ)〉
]
dt
+〈[∑s′ 6=s(Pi(t, s′)− Pi(t, s))q˜ss′ ](X − X¯), X − X¯〉dt
+〈[∑s′ 6=s(P¯i(t, s′)− P¯i(t, s))q˜ss′ ]X¯, X¯〉dt
+[
∑
s′ 6=s(δi(t, s
′)− δi(t, s))q˜ss′ ]dt
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Reference
RS without
mean-field
classical RN robust control
design
this work
1 RS decision-
maker
-RN mean-field free robust
control design
X RN mean-field type robust control
design
- different mean state than
the original RS problem
X same mean state as the original RS
problem
-designed a fictitious RN
adversary
X designed a fictitious RN adversary
with non-zero mean contri-
bution to the state
with zero mean contribution to the
state
1 RS team (full
cooperation)
-RN mean-field free robust
control design
X RN mean-field type control design
- different mean state than
the original RS problem
X same mean state as the original RS
problem
-designed a fictitious RN
adversary
X designed a fictitious RN adversary
with non-zero mean contri-
bution to the state
with zero mean contribution to the
state
n- RS non-
cooperative
DMs
-RN mean-field free robust
control design
X RN mean-field type control design
-different mean state than
the original RS problem
X same mean state as the original RS
problem
-designed a fictitious RN
adversary
X designed a fictitious RN adversary
with non-zero mean contri-
bution to the state
with zero mean contribution to the
state
Table 2: Contribution to Mean-Field-Free Games. RS stands for risk-
sensitive, RN: risk neutral, DM: decision-maker.
Now we compute the expectation of the difference Li − Fi(0) yields
E[(Li − Fi(0))]
= E〈(Qi(T, s(T ))− Pi(T, s(T )))(X(T )− X¯(T )),
X(T )− X¯(T )〉
+E〈(Qi(T, s(T )) + Q¯i(T, s(T ))− P¯i(T, s(T )))X¯(T ), X¯(T )〉
+E[0− δi(T, s(T ))]
+E
∫ T
0
〈[P˙i +Qi +B∗1(P ∗i + Pi)
+
∑
s′ 6=s(Pi(t, s
′)− Pi(t, s))q˜ss′ ](X − X¯), X − X¯〉dt
+E
∫ T
0
〈[ ˙¯Pi +Qi + Q¯i + (B1 + B¯1)∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)
+
∑
s′ 6=s(P¯i(t, s
′)− P¯i(t, s))q˜ss′ ]X¯, X¯〉dt
+E
∫ T
0
δ˙idt+
1
2
E
∫ T
0
〈(P ∗i + Pi)S0, S0〉dt
+1
2
E
∫ T
0
∫
Θ
〈(P ∗i + Pi)M0,M0ν(dθ)〉dt
+E
∫ T
0
[
∑
s′ 6=s(δi(t, s
′)− δi(t, s))q˜ss′ ]dt
+E
∫ T
0
〈Ri(Ui − U¯i), Ui − U¯i〉dt
+E
∫ T
0
〈B∗2i(P ∗i + Pi)(X − X¯), Ui − U¯i〉dt
+E
∫ T
0
〈(Ri + R¯i)U¯i, U¯i〉dt
+E
∫ T
0
〈(B2i + B¯2i)∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)X¯, U¯i〉dt
+E
∫ T
0
〈(P ∗i + Pi)(X − X¯),
∑
j 6=iB2j(Uj − U¯j)〉dt
+E
∫ T
0
〈(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)X¯,
∑
j 6=i(B2j + B¯2j)U¯j〉dt
(12)
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Reference
RS mean-field-type dependent classical this work
1 RS decision-maker X RN mean-field type robust control design
X same mean state as the original RS problem
X designed a fictitious RN adversary
with zero mean contribution to the state
1 RS team (full cooperation) X RN mean-field type robust control design
X same mean state as the original RS problem
X designed 1 fictitious RN adversary
with zero mean contribution to the state
n- RS non-cooperative DMs X RN mean-field type robust control design
X same mean state as the original RS problem
X designed n-fictitious RN adversaries
with zero mean contribution to the state
Table 3: Contributions to mean-field-dependent games. RS stands for risk-
sensitive, RN: risk neutral, DM: decision-maker.
Now we perform the following square completion for the terms involving
Ui − U¯i. First, consider the following structure:
|L1[L2(Ui − U¯i)+L3(X − X¯)]|2
= 〈L1L2(Ui − U¯i)+L1L3(X − X¯),
L1L2(Ui − U¯i)+L1L3(X − X¯)〉
= 〈L1L2(Ui − U¯i), L1L2(Ui − U¯i)〉
+2〈L1L3(X − X¯), L1L2(Ui − U¯i)〉
+〈L1L3(X − X¯), L1L3(X − X¯)〉.
Then, it is concluded that
〈L1L2(Ui − U¯i), L1L2(Ui − U¯i)〉
= 〈Ri(Ui − U¯i), Ui − U¯i〉,
2〈L1L3(X − X¯), L1L2(Ui − U¯i)〉
= 〈B∗2i(P ∗i + Pi)(X − X¯), Ui − U¯i〉.
Thus, by setting L1 = R
− 1
2
i , L2 = Ri, and L3 =
1
2
B∗2i(P
∗
i + Pi) yields
L∗2L
∗
1L1L2 = Ri,
L∗2L
∗
1L1L3 = B
∗
2i(P
∗
i + Pi).
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Hence,
E
∫ T
0
〈Ri(Ui − U¯i), Ui − U¯i〉dt
+E
∫ T
0
〈B∗2i(P ∗i + Pi)(X − X¯), Ui − U¯i〉dt
= E
∫ T
0
|R
1
2
i [Ui − U¯i+12R−1i B∗2i(P ∗i + Pi)(X − X¯)]|2dt
−1
4
E
∫ T
0
〈(P ∗i + Pi)B2iR−
1
2
∗R−
1
2B∗2i(P
∗
i + Pi)(X − X¯),
X − X¯〉dt.
(13)
Using the same procedure for the terms U¯i with the structure |L˜1[L˜2U¯i+L˜3X¯]|2
yields
〈L˜1L˜2(Ui − U¯i), L˜1L˜2(Ui − U¯i)〉
= 〈(Ri + R¯i)U¯i, U¯i〉,
2〈L˜1L˜3(X − X¯), L˜1L˜2(Ui − U¯i)〉
= 〈(B2i + B¯2i)∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)X¯, U¯i〉.
Thus, by setting L˜1 = (Ri+R¯i)
− 1
2 , L˜2 = Ri+R¯i, and L˜3 =
1
2
(B2i+B¯2i)
∗(P¯ ∗i +
P¯i) yields
E
∫ T
0
〈(Ri + R¯i)U¯i, U¯i〉+ 〈(B2i + B¯2i)∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)X¯, U¯i〉dt
= E
∫ T
0
|(Ri + R¯i) 12 [U¯i
+1
2
(Ri + R¯i)
−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)X¯]|2dt
−1
4
E
∫ T
0
〈(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)(B2i + B¯2i)(Ri + R¯i)−
1
2
∗
(Ri + R¯i)
− 1
2 (B2i + B¯2i)
∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)X¯, X¯〉dt.
(14)
From (12), and replacing the square completions in (13)-(14), we obtain
that
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E[(Li − Fi(0))]
= E〈(Qi(T, s(T ))− Pi(T, s(T )))(X(T )− X¯(T )),
X(T )− X¯(T )〉
+E〈(Qi(T, s(T )) + Q¯i(T, s(T ))− P¯i(T, s(T )))X¯(T ), X¯(T )〉
+E[0− δi(T, s(T ))]
+E
∫ T
0
〈[P˙i +Qi +B∗1(P ∗i + Pi)
+
∑
s′ 6=s(Pi(t, s
′)− Pi(t, s))q˜ss′ ](X − X¯), X − X¯〉dt
+E
∫ T
0
〈[ ˙¯Pi +Qi + Q¯i + (B1 + B¯1)∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)
+
∑
s′ 6=s(P¯i(t, s
′)− P¯i(t, s))q˜ss′ ]X¯, X¯〉dt
+E
∫ T
0
δ˙idt+
1
2
E
∫ T
0
〈(P ∗i + Pi)S0, S0〉dt
+1
2
E
∫ T
0
∫
Θ
〈(P ∗i + Pi)M0,M0ν(dθ)〉dt
+E
∫ T
0
[
∑
s′ 6=s(δi(t, s
′)− δi(t, s))q˜ss′ ]dt
+E
∫ T
0
|R
1
2
i [Ui − U¯i+12R−1i B∗2i(P ∗i + Pi)(X − X¯)]|2dt
−1
4
E
∫ T
0
〈(P ∗i + Pi)B2iR−
1
2
∗R−
1
2B∗2i(P
∗
i + Pi)(X − X¯),
X − X¯〉dt
+E
∫ T
0
|(Ri + R¯i) 12 [U¯i
+1
2
(Ri + R¯i)
−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)X¯]|2dt
−1
4
E
∫ T
0
〈(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)(B2i + B¯2i)(Ri + R¯i)−
1
2
∗
(Ri + R¯i)
− 1
2 (B2i + B¯2i)
∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)X¯, X¯〉dt
+E
∫ T
0
1
2
〈(P ∗i + Pi)(X − X¯),∑
j 6=iB2jR
−1
j B
∗
2j(P
∗
j + Pj)(X − X¯)〉dt
+E
∫ T
0
1
2
〈(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)X¯,∑
j 6=i(B2j + B¯2j)(Rj + R¯j)
−1(B2j + B¯2j)∗(P¯ ∗j + P¯j)X¯〉dt
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By grouping the terms one arrives at the following equality:
E[(Li − Fi(0))]
= E〈(Qi(T, s(T ))− Pi(T, s(T )))(X(T )− X¯(T )),
X(T )− X¯(T )〉
+E〈(Qi(T, s(T )) + Q¯i(T, s(T ))− P¯i(T, s(T )))X¯(T ), X¯(T )〉
+E[0− δi(T, s(T ))]
+E
∫ T
0
〈[
P˙i +Qi +B
∗
1(P
∗
i + Pi)
+
∑
s′ 6=s(Pi(t, s
′)− Pi(t, s))q˜ss′
−1
4
(P ∗i + Pi)B2iRi
− 1
2
∗Ri−
1
2B∗2i(P
∗
i + Pi)
+1
2
∑
j 6=i(P
∗
j + Pj)B2jR
−1∗
j B
∗
2j(P
∗
i + Pi)
]
(X − X¯),
X − X¯
〉
dt
+E
∫ T
0
〈[
˙¯Pi +Qi + Q¯i + (B1 + B¯1)
∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)
+
∑
s′ 6=s(P¯i(t, s
′)− P¯i(t, s))q˜ss′
−1
4
(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)(B2i + B¯2i)(Ri + R¯i)
− 1
2
∗
(Ri + R¯i)
− 1
2 (B2i + B¯2i)
∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)
+1
2
∑
j 6=i(P¯
∗
j + P¯j)
∗(B2j + B¯2j)(Rj + R¯j)−1∗
(B2j + B¯2j)
∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)
]
X¯, X¯
〉
dt
+E
∫ T
0
[
δ˙i +
1
2
〈(P ∗i + Pi)S0, S0〉+ 12
∫
Θ
〈(P ∗i + Pi)M0,
M0ν(dθ)〉+
∑
s′ 6=s(δi(t, s
′)− δi(t, s))q˜ss′
]
dt
+E
∫ T
0
|R
1
2
i [Ui − U¯i+12R−1i B∗2i(P ∗i + Pi)(X − X¯)]|2dt
+E
∫ T
0
|(Ri + R¯i) 12 [U¯i
+1
2
(Ri + R¯i)
−1(B2i + B¯2i)∗(P¯ ∗i + P¯i)X¯]|2dt
Finally, we are making the process identification minimizing terms obtaining
the announced result. 
5.2 Proof of the Risk-Sensitive Statement
We now prove Theorem 2. The martingale term in the Itoˆ’s formula is
2λi
∫ T
0
〈S∗0Pi(X − X¯), dB〉. By adding and removing the term
2λ2i
∫ T
0
〈PiS0S∗0Pi(X − X¯), (X − X¯)〉dt,
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to the Itoˆ’s formula we re-organize the exponential quadratic terms. Using
that relation
E
[
exp
{
2λi
∫ T
0
〈S∗0Pi(X − X¯), dB〉
−2λ2i
∫ T
0
〈PiS0S∗0Pi(X − X¯), (X − X¯)〉dt
}]
= 1,
and matching the term in Pi we arrive at the announced result. This com-
pletes the proof.
6 Concluding Remarks
In this article we studied risk-sensitive, robust and risk-neutral mean-field-
type games in a matrix-valued linear-quadratic setting. Non-cooperation, full
cooperation, adversarial games are analyzed and their solutions are provided
in a semi-explicit way. In addition, important relationships between these
problems are established. For a class of linear-quadratic risk-sensitive mean-
field-type game problems driven by (matrix-valued) Brownian motions, we
have designed a novel linear-quadratic risk-neutral robust mean-field-type
game problems that preserves the same mean trajectory. The coefficients
considered in this paper are random in the sense that they are parametrized
with regime switching. This opens the question of extension to other type of
correlated noises and other random coefficients. We leave this question for
future investigation.
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